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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the links between instantiated argumentation systems and the axioms for non-
monotonic reasoning described in [9] with the aim of characterising the nature of argument based reasoning.
In doing so, we consider two possible interpretations of the consequence relation, and describe which axioms
are met by ASPIC+ under each of these interpretations. We then consider the links between these axioms and
the rationality postulates. Our results indicate that argument based reasoning as characterised by ASPIC+is —
according to the axioms of [9] — non-cumulative and non-monotonic, and therefore weaker than the weakest
non-monotonic reasoning systems they considered possible. This weakness underpins ASPIC+’s success in
modelling other reasoning systems, and we conclude by considering the relationship between ASPIC+and
other weak logical systems.
1 Introduction
The rationality postulates proposed by Caminada and Amgoud [3] have been influential in the development of
instantiated argumentation systems. These postulates identify desirable properties for the conclusions drawn
from an argument based reasoning process, and focus on the effects of non-defeasible rules within an argu-
mentation system. However, these postulates provide no desiderata with regards to the conclusions drawn from
the defeasible rules found within an argumentation system. This latter type of rule is critical to argumentation,
and identifying postulates for such rules is therefore important. At the same time, a large body of work exists
which deals with non-monotonic reasoning (NMR). Such NMR systems (exemplified by approaches such as
circumscription [11], default logic [16] and auto-epistemic logic [14]) introduce various approaches to handling
defeasible reasoning, and axioms have been proposed to categorise such systems [9].
In this paper we seek to combine the rich existing body of work on NMR with structured argumentation
systems. We aim to identify what axioms structured argument systems, exemplified by ASPIC+[12] meet1. In
doing so, we also wish to investigate the links between NMR axioms and the rationality postulates. Doing so
may, in the future, allow us to identify additional postulates which apply to the defeasible portion of structured
argumentation systems.
1ASPIC+ was selected for this study due to its popularity, and its ability to model a variety of other structured systems [13].
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2 ASPIC+ Argumentation Framework
ASPIC+ [12] is a widely used formalism for structured argumentation, which satisfies the rationality postulates
of [3]. Arguments within ASPIC+ are constructed by chaining two types of inference rules, beginning with
elements of a knowledge base. The first type of inference rule is referred to as a strict rule, and represents
rules whose conclusion can unconditionally be drawn from a set of premises. This is in contrast to defeasible
inference rules, which allow for a conclusion to be drawn from a set of premises as long as no exceptions or
contrary conclusions exist.
Definition 1 An argumentation system is a triple AS = 〈L,R, n〉 where:
• L is a logical language closed under negation2 ·¯.
• R = Rs ∪Rd is a set of strict (Rs ) and defeasible (Rd ) inference rules of the form φ1, . . . , φn → φ and
φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ respectively (where φi , φ are meta-variables ranging over wff in L), and Rs ∩Rd = ∅.
• n : Rd 7→ L is a naming convention for defeasible rules.
We write φ1, . . . , φn  φ if R contains a rule of the form φ1, . . . , φn → φ or φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ.
Definition 2 A knowledge base in an argumentation system 〈L,R, n〉 is a set K ⊆ L consisting of two disjoint
subsets Kn (the axioms) and Kp (the ordinary premises).
An argumentation theory consists of an argumentation system and knowledge base.
Definition 3 An argumentation theory AT is a pair 〈AS ,K〉, where AS is an argumentation system AS andK
is a knowledge base.
An argumentation theory is strict iff Rd = ∅ and Kp = ∅, and is defeasible iff it is not strict.
To ensure that reasoning meets norms for rational reasoning according to the rationality postulates of [3],
an ASPIC+ argumentation system must be such that its strict rules are closed under transposition. That is, given
a strict rule with premises ϕ = {φ1, . . . , φn} and conclusion φ (written ϕ → φ), a set of n additional rules of
the following form must be present in the system: {φ} ∪ ϕ\{φi} → φi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n .
Arguments are defined recursively in terms of sub-arguments and through the use of several functions:
Prem(A) returns all the premises of argument A; Conc(A) returns A’s conclusion, and TopRule(A) returns the
last rule used within the argument. Sub(A) returns all of A’s sub-arguments. Given this, arguments are defined
as follows.
Definition 4 An argument A on the basis of an argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 is:
1. φ if φ ∈ K with: Prem(A) = {φ}; Conc(A) = {φ}; Sub(A) = {A}; TopRule(A) = undefined.
2. A1, . . . ,An → / ⇒ φ if Ai are arguments such that there respectively exists a strict/defeasible rule
Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An) → /⇒ φ in Rs / Rd . Prem(A) = Prem(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Prem(An); Conc(A) =
φ; Sub(A) = Sub(A1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(An) ∪ {A}; TopRule(A) = Conc(A1), . . . , Conc(An)→ /⇒ φ.
We write A(AT ) to denote the set of arguments on the basis of the theory AT , and given a set of arguments A,
we write Concs(A) to denote the conclusions of those arguments, that is:
Concs(A) = {Conc(A)|A ∈ A}
Like other argumentation systems, ASPIC+ utilises conflict between arguments — represented through attacks
— to determine what conclusions are justified.
An argument can be attacked in three ways: on its ordinary premises, on its conclusion, or on its inference
rules. These three kinds of attack are called undermining, rebutting and undercutting attacks, respectively.
2This is a small deviation from the standard presentation of ASPIC+, which makes use of a contrariness function which need not be
symmetrical.
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Definition 5 An argument A attacks an argument B iff A undermines, rebuts or undercuts B , where:
• A undermines B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B ′ = φ ∈ Prem(B) and φ ∈ Kp .
• A rebuts B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) = φ for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B) of the form B ′′1 , . . . ,B ′′2 ⇒ φ.
• A undercuts B (on B ′) iff Conc(A) = n(r) for some B ′ ∈ Sub(B) such that TopRule(B) is a defeasible
rule r of the form φ1, . . . , φn ⇒ φ.
Note that, in ASPIC+ rebutting is restricted. That is an argument with a strict TopRule can rebut an argument
with a defeasible TopRule, but not vice versa. ([4] and [10] introduce the ASPIC- and ASPIC+D systems which
use unrestricted rebut). Finally, A set of arguments is said to be consistent iff there is no attack between any
arguments in the set.
Attacks can be distinguished by whether they are preference-dependent (rebutting and undermining) or
preference-independent (undercutting). The former succeed only when the attacker is preferred. The latter
succeed whether or not the attacker is preferred. Within ASPIC+ preferences over defeasible rules and ordinary
premises are combined or lifted to obtain a preference ordering over arguments [12]. Here, we are not concerned
about the means of combination, but, following [12], we only consider reasonable orderings. For our purposes,
a reasonable ordering is one such that adding a strict rule or axiom to an argument will neither increase nor
decrease its preference level.
Definition 6 A preference ordering  is a binary relation over arguments, i.e.,  ⊆ A×A, where A is the set
of all arguments constructed from the knowledge base in an argumentation system.
Combining these elements results in the following:
Definition 7 A structured argumentation framework is a triple 〈A, att ,〉, where A is the set of all arguments
constructed from the argumentation system, att is the attack relation, and  is a preference ordering on A.
Preferences over arguments interact with attacks such that preference-dependent attacks succeed when the at-
tacking argument is preferred. In contrast preference-independent attacks always succeed. Attacks that succeed
are called defeats. Using Definition 4 and the notion of defeat, we can instantiate an abstract argumentation
framework from a structured argumentation framework.
Definition 8 An (abstract) argumentation framework AF corresponding to a structured argumentation frame-
work SAF = 〈A, att ,〉 is a pair 〈A,Defeats〉 such that Defeats is the defeat relation on A determined by
SAF .
This abstract argumentation framework can be evaluated using standard argumentation semantics [5], defining
the notion of an extension:
Definition 9 Let AF = 〈A,Defeats〉 be an abstract argumentation framework, Let A ∈ A and E ⊆ A. E
is said to be conflict-free iff there do not exist a B ,C ∈ E such that B defeats C . E is said to defend A
iff for every B ∈ A such that B defeats A, there exists a C ∈ E such that C defeats B . The characteristic
function F : 2A → 2A is defined as F (E ) = {A ∈ A|E defends A}. E is called (1) an admissible set iff E
is conflict-free and E ⊆ F (E ); (2) a complete extension iff E is conflict-free and E = F (E ); (3) a grounded
extension iff E is the minimal complete extension; and (4) a preferred extension iff E is a maximal complete
extension, where minimality and maximality are w.r.t. set inclusion.
We note in passing that other extensions have been defined and refer the reader to [1] for further details.
Definition 10 If AF = 〈A,Defeats〉 is an abstract argumentation framework, and E is the extension under
one of Dung’s semantics. We write Just(A) to denote the set of justified conclusions of the set of argumentsA,
i.e., Just(A) = {Concs(E )}.
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Abbr. Axiom Name
Ref α |∼ α Reflexivity
LLE |= α ≡ β α |∼ γ
β |∼ γ
Left Logical
Equivalence
RW |= α →֒ β γ |∼ α
γ |∼ β
Right
Weakening
Cut α ∧ β |∼ γ α |∼ β
α |∼ γ
CM α |∼ β α |∼ γ
α ∧ β |∼ γ
Cautious
Monotonicity
M |= α →֒ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Monotonicity
T α |∼ β β |∼ γ
α |∼ γ
Transitivity
CP α |∼ β
β |∼ α
Contraposition
Table 1: The axioms from [9] that we will consider.
3 Axiomatic Reasoning and ASPIC+
Kraus et al. [9], building on earlier work by Gabbay [6], identified a set of axioms which characterise non-
monotonic inference in logical systems, and studied the relationships between sets of these axioms. Their goal
was to characterise different kinds of reasoning; to pin down what it means for a logical system to be monotonic
or non-monotonic; and — in particular — to be able distinguish between the two. Table 1 presents the axioms
of [9], which we will use to characterise reasoning in ASPIC+. The symbol |∼ encodes a consequence relation,
while |= identifies the statements obtainable from the underlying theory. Note that we have altered some of
the symbols used in [9] to avoid confusion with the notation of ASPIC+. Equivalence is denoted ≡ (rather than
↔), and →֒ (rather than →) denotes the existence of a rule, acknowledging the fact that a rule may be strict or
defeasible.
Consequence relations that satisfy Ref, LLE, RW, Cut and CM are said to be cumulative, and [9] describes
them as being the weakest interesting logical system. Cumulative consequence relations which also satisfy CP
are monotonic, while consequence relations that are cumulative and satisfy M are called cumulative monotonic.
Such relations are stronger than cumulative but not monotonic in the usual sense.
To determine which axioms ASPIC+does or does not comply with, we must decide how different aspects of
the axioms should be interpreted. We interpret the consequence relation |∼ in a couple of ways that are natural
in the context of ASPIC+— describing these in detail later — and which fit with the high level meaning of “if α
is in the knowledge base, then β is a conclusion”, or “β is a consequence of α”.
Assuming such an interpretation of α |∼ β we can consider the meaning of the axioms. Some axioms
are clear. For example, axiom T says that if β is a consequence of α, and γ is a consequence of β, then
γ is a consequence of α. Other axioms are more ambiguous. Does α ∧ β |∼ γ in Cut mean that γ is a
consequence of the conjunction α ∧ β or is it a consequence of α and β together? In other words is ∧ a feature
of the language underlying the reasoning system, or a feature of the meta-language in which the properties are
written? Similarly, given the distinction between strict and defeasible rules, is α →֒ β a strict rule in ASPIC+, a
defeasible rule, or some statement in the property meta-language?
The symbols found in the axioms are interpreted as follows.
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• |= α means that α is an element of the relevant argumentation theory AT .
• α ∧ β means both α and β, in particular in Cut and CM, it means that both α and β are in the knowledge
base.
• α ≡ β is taken — as usual — to abbreviate the formula (α →֒ β) ∧ (β →֒ α). We assume α →֒ β and
β →֒ α have the same interpretation, i.e., both or neither are strict.
• α →֒ β has two interpretations. We have the strict interpretation in which α →֒ β denotes a strict rule
α → β in ASPIC+, and the defeasible interpretation in which α →֒ β denotes either a strict or defeasible
rule. We denote the latter interpretation by writing α β.
4 Axioms and Consequences in ASPIC+
We now consider the two different interpretations of the non-monotonic consequence relation |∼ described
above, identifying which axioms each interpretation satisfies. In the following, we assume an arbitrary ASPIC+
argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉, and write ATx for an extension of this augmentation theory also
containing proposition x : ATx = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K ∪ {x}〉. An argument present in the latter, but not former,
theory is denoted Ax .
4.1 Argument Construction
We begin by considering the consequence relation as representing argument construction. I.e., we interpret
α |∼ β as meaning that if α is in the axioms or ordinary premises of a theory, we can construct an argument for
β. More precisely:
Definition 11 We write α |∼a β, if for every ASPIC+ argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 such that
β 6∈ Concs(A(AT )), it is the case that β ∈ Concs(A(ATα)).
Proposition 1 The consequence relation |∼a is cumulative for both strict and defeasible theories.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉. [Ref] Given a theory ATα, we have an argument
Aα = [α], so Ref holds for |∼a . [LLE] Since α |∼a γ, ATα contains a chain of arguments Aα1 ,Aα2 , . . . ,Aαn
with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(Aαn) = γ. Given |= α ≡ β, we have that both α  β and β  α are in the
theory AT , so in the theory ATβ . In the theory ATβ , we obtain a chain of arguments Bβ0 = [β],Bβ1 =
[Bβ0  α],A
β
2 , . . . ,A
β
n . That is β |∼a γ. Therefore, both strict and defeasible versions of LLE hold for
|∼a . [RW] Since γ |∼a α in theory ATγ , there is a chain of arguments Aγ1 ,Aγ2 , . . . ,Aγn with Aγ1 = [γ] and
Conc(Aγn) = α. Given |= α →֒ β, α  β is in the theory AT , it is also in ATγ . In ATγ , we have a chain
of arguments Aγ1 , . . . ,Aγn ,Aγn+1 = [Aγn ⇒ β]. Thus, γ |∼a β, and both strict and defeasible versions of RW
hold for |∼a . [Cut] Since α ∧ β |∼a γ, in theory ATα,β , there is a chain of arguments Aα,β1 ,Aα,β2 , . . . ,Aα,βn
with Aα,β1 = [α], A
α,β
2 = [β] and Conc(Aα,βn ) = γ. In the theory ATα, since α |∼a β, there is a chain
of arguments Bα1 ,Bα2 , . . . ,Bαm with Bα1 = [α] and Conc(Bαm ) = β. There is also a chain of arguments
Bα1 ,B
α
2 , . . . ,B
α
m ,A
α
3 , . . . ,A
α
n . That is α |∼a γ. Therefore, cut holds for |∼a . [CM] Since α |∼a γ ATα has a
chain of arguments Aα1 , . . . ,Aαn with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(Aαn) = γ. ATα,β has a similar chain of arguments
A
α,β
1 , . . . ,A
α,β
n , so α ∧ β |∼a γ. CM thus holds for |∼a .
Since all of the above axioms hold, |∼a is cumulative for both strict and defeasible theories. 
Proposition 2 The consequence relation |∼a satisfies M and T for both strict and defeasible theories.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉. [M] Since β |∼a γ, in the theory ATβ , there is a
chain of arguments Aβ1 ,Aβ2 , . . . ,Aβn with Aβ1 = [β] and Conc(Aβn) = γ. Given |= α →֒ β, we have α  β in
the theory AT , and also in the theory ATα. In the latter, there is a chain of arguments Bα0 = [α],Bα1 = [Bα0  
β],Aα2 , . . . ,A
α
n . That is α |∼a γ. Therefore, both strict and defeasible versions of M hold for |∼a . [T] Since
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β |∼a γ, in ATβ , there is a chain of arguments Bβ1 ,Bβ2 , . . . ,Bβm with Bβ1 = [β] and Conc(Bβm) = γ. Similarly,
since α |∼a β, in ATα, there is a chain of arguments Aα1 ,Aα2 , . . . ,Aαn with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(Aαn) = β.
Combined with Bα1 ,Bα2 , . . . ,Bαm , we obtain a chain of arguments Aα1 ,Aα2 , . . . ,Aαn ,Bα2 , . . . ,Bαm . That is α |∼a
γ. Therefore, T holds for |∼a . 
Thus |∼a is cumulative monotonic for all theories. It is not, however, monotonic.
Proposition 3 |∼a does not satisfy axiom CP.
Proof Consider this counter-example. K = {c},Rs = {α, c → d ;α, d → c; c, d → α;α → e; e → α; d , e →
β; d , β → e;β, e → d} We have α |∼a β but not β |∼a α. Therefore, CP does not hold for |∼a . 
4.2 Justified Conclusions
Next we consider α |∼ β as meaning that if α is in a theory, we can construct an argument for β such that β
is in the set of justified conclusions (regardless of preferences). In the following, we will consider an arbitrary
extension containing the justified conclusions, these proofs are therefore applicable to any extension based
semantics.
Definition 12 We write α |∼j β, if for every ASPIC+ argumentation theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉 such that
β 6∈ Just(A(AT )), it is the case that β ∈ Just(A(ATα))
It is worth noting the following result.
Proposition 4 If α |∼j β then α |∼a β.
Proof Follows immediately from the definitions — for β to be a justified conclusion, there must first be an
argument with β as a conclusion. 
Since there are, in general, less justified conclusions of a theory than there are arguments, |∼j is a more restric-
tive notion of consequence than |∼a . It is therefore no surprise to find that fewer of the axioms from [9] hold.
We have the following.
Proposition 5 The consequence relation |∼j does not satisfy reflexivity, or the defeasible versions of LLE and
RW.
Proof [Ref] Counterexample: consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains: Kn = {a} and R = ∅. Here,
we have an argument A = [a]. If a is in the knowledge base Kp , we have another argument B = [a].
However, B is defeated by A, but not vice versa. So B is not in any extension, and Ref does not hold for
|∼j . [LLE (defeasible version)] Counter-example: consider an ASPIC+ theory that contains Kn = {c} and
R = {a ⇒ b; b ⇒ a; a ⇒ r ; c → n1} where n(b ⇒ a) = n1. Here, a |∼j r , but, b 6|∼j r . Therefore,
the defeasible version of LLE does not hold for |∼j . [RW (defeasible version)] Consider any ASPIC+ theory
that contains β in its axioms. For such a theory, β will not appear in any justified conclusions. Therefore, the
defeasible version of RW does not hold for |∼j . 
Proposition 6 |∼j satisfies the strict version of LLE and RW, Cut and CM for strict or defeasible theories.
Proof Consider an arbitrary theory AT = 〈〈L,R, n〉,K〉. [LLE (strict version)]] Since |= α ≡ β, under
the strict interpretation, the rule β → α is in AT , ATα and ATβ . Since α |∼j γ, we know that there is an
extension Eα containing Aα1 ,Aα2 , . . . ,Aαn with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(Aαn) = γ. Furthermore, there is no attack3
between Ai (i = 1 . . .n) and Bα, where Bα is an argument in Eα. In addition, there is no argument with
conclusion β in Eα since Aα1 is in Eα and there is a strict rule α → β4. Now consider theory ATβ , which has
3Note that since |∼j considers any preference ordering, attacks and defeats here are equivalent.
4Due to closure under strict rules.
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Table 2: Summary of axioms satisfied by the argumentation-based consequence relations. Y indicates that the
axiom holds for strict and defeasible theories without constraint; (Y) that the axiom holds for strict theories only;
[Y] that the strict version of the axiom holds in a theory of strict and defeasible rules (i.e., the rule mentioned in
the axiom has to be strict, but arguments may contain defeasible rules); and N that the axiom does not hold for
any theory. The left-hand set of axioms are those required for cumulativity.
Ref LLE RW Cut CM M T CP
|∼a Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
|∼j (Y) [Y] [Y] Y Y (Y) (Y) N
a chain of arguments Aβ0 = [β],Aβ1 = [Aβ0 → α],Aβ2 , . . . ,Aβn , where Conc(Aβn) = γ. There is an extension
Eβ = {A
β
0 , . . . ,A
β
n} ∪ (Eα − {A
α
1 , . . . ,A
α
n}) in ATβ under the same semantic. Therefore strict LLE holds for
|∼j . [RW (strict version)] Consider the extension Eγ in ATγ containing an argument Aγ with Conc(Aγ) = α.
Since |= α β, under the strict interpretation, we know that α→ β is in ATγ . Because of closure under strict
rules, Bγ = [Aγ → β] is in Eγ . Therefore the strict version of RW holds for |∼j . [Cut] Since α ∧ β |∼j γ, we
know that there is an extension Eα,β of ATα,β containing Bα,β ,Aα,β1 , . . . ,Aα,βn with Aα,β1 = [α], Bα,β = [β]
and Conc(Aα,βn ) = γ. Now consider the theory ATα. Since α |∼j β, there is an extension Eα containing
Bα1 ,B
α
2 . . . ,B
α
m with Bα1 = [α] and Conc(Bαm ) = β. The set Eα ∪ (Eα,β − {Bα,β}) is an extension in ATα
(c.f., LLE above). Therefore cut holds for |∼j . [CM] Since α |∼j β, ATα and ATα,β contain similar arguments.
Since α |∼j γ, there is an extension Eα in ATα containing Aα1 , . . . ,Aαn with Aα1 = [α] and Conc(Aαn) = γ. Eα
is also an extension in ATα,β , since ATα and ATα,β contain similar arguments. Therefore CM holds for |∼j .

Proposition 7 The consequence relation |∼j does not satisfy M, T or CP for defeasible theories.
Proof We will give counter-examples. [M] Consider the ASPIC+ theory that includes Kn = {a} and R =
{a → b; b → a; b ⇒ γ}. Thus, b |∼j γ, however, a 6|∼j γ. Therefore, M does not hold for |∼j . [T] Consider
the ASPIC+ theory which includes K = ∅ and R = {a ⇒ b; b ⇒ c; c ⇒ r ; a → c}. Thus, a |∼j b and
b |∼j r , but a 6|∼j r . Therefore, T does not hold for |∼j . [CP] Since contraposition does not hold for |∼a , by
Proposition 3 it cannot hold for |∼j . 
If we consider only strict theories, the following holds.
Proposition 8 The consequence relation |∼j satisfies Ref, M and T for strict theories.
Proof If the theory is strict, for any argumentation theory, all conclusions are justified. Therefore, for any strict
theory, if α |∼a β, then α |∼j β. We know that |∼a holds for Ref, M and T, therefore, |∼j holds for Ref, M and
T in a strict theory. 
Thus |∼j is cumulative monotonic for strict theories.
4.3 Discussion
The results from the previous sections are summarized in Table 2. What light does the above shine on ASPIC+
and argumentation-based reasoning in general? Considering |∼a , it is no surprise that the relation is cumulative
monotonic and satisfies the axiom M which captures a form of monotonicity. It is clear from the detail of
ASPIC+, and indeed any argumentation system, that the number of arguments grows over time. However, the
fact that |∼a is not monotonic in the same strict sense as classical logic, and so is strictly weaker, as a result of
not satisfying CP, is a bit more interesting. This is, of course, because arguments are not subject to the law of
the excluded middle — it is perfectly possible for there to be arguments for α and α from the same theory.
Turning to |∼j , this is perhaps a more reasonable notion of consequence for ASPIC+ than |∼a . If α |∼j β,
then there is an argument for β which holds despite any attacks (in the scenario we have considered, where all
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attacks may be defeats for some preference ordering — and therefore succeed — there can still be attacks on
the argument for β, but the attacking arguments must themselves be defeated). This is quite a restrictive notion
of consequence in a representation that allows for conflicting information, and as Table 2 makes clear, |∼j is
a relatively weak notion of consequence. It obeys less of the axioms and thus sanctions less conclusions than
the non-monotonic logics analysed in [9], for example. For defeasible theories |∼j is not cumulative, and only
satisfies LLE and RW if the rules applied in those axioms are strict. As we pointed out above, at the time that
[9] was published, cumulativity was considered the minimum requirement of a useful logic5. Whether or not
one accepts this, it is clear that ASPIC+ is weak. But is it too weak? To answer this, we should consider the
cause of the weakness, which as Table 2 shows is due to LLE, RW and Ref.
LLE and RW only hold if the axioms are only applied to strict rules. In both cases, the effect of the
axiom is to extend an existing argument, either switching one premise for another (LLE), or adding a rule to
the conclusion of an argument (RW). While having these axioms hold for defeasible rules would allow |∼j
to be cumulative for defeasible theories, it is not reasonable for justified conclusions to be drawn under these
circumstances — using LLE or RW to extend arguments with defeasible rules by definition means that the new
arguments can be defeated. Thus their conclusions may not be justified.
A similar argument applies to Ref. Proposition 8 tells us that Ref holds for |∼j for strict theories. In effect
that means that α has to be an axiom. If Ref were to hold for defeasible theories, α could be a premise. But
premises can be defeated, again by definition, so it is not appropriate to directly conclude that any premise is a
justified conclusion (it is necessary to go through the whole process of constructing arguments and establishing
extensions to determine this).
From this we conclude that though |∼j is not cumulative, and hence ASPIC+ is, in some sense, weaker than
non-monotonic logics like circumscription [11] and default logic [16], it is not clear that it is too weak. That
is strengthening |∼j so that it is cumulative for defeasible theories would allow conclusions that make no sense
from the point of view of argumentation-based reasoning. Whether there are other ways to strengthen ASPIC+
that do make sense is an open question, and one we will investigate.
5 The Rationality Postulates
Finally, we consider the three postulates of [3] (which ASPIC+ complies with), namely (1) closure under strict
rules; and (2) direct and (3) indirect consistency. We ask whether the axioms discussed in this paper are equiv-
alent to any of these postulates. In what follows, we assume that strict rules are consistent.
5.1 Closure under strict rules
Proposition 9 An argumentation framework meets closure under strict rules if and only if the consequence
relation for strict rules complies with right weakening (RW) with regards to justified conclusions.
Proof Given an argumentation framework AF , assume that α is in the justified conclusions. Therefore⊤ |∼j α,
and assume that there is a strict rule |= α → β. Using RW, we obtain ⊤ |∼j β. Therefore RW implies closure
under strict rules. Furthermore, as per the proof of Proposition 6, closure under strict rules implies that |∼j
satisfies RW. 
5.2 Direct consistency
Direct consistency with regards to |∼j requires that no extension contains inconsistent arguments (and therefore
inconsistent conclusions). This is equivalent to the following axiom, unobtainable from the axioms discussed
previously.
α |∼j β
α 6|∼j β
5This position was doubtless a side-effect of the fact that at that time there were no logics that did not obey cumulativity. Subsequent
discovery of logics of causality that are not cumulative suggests that this view should be revised.
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5.3 Indirect Consistency
Proposition 10 Assume we have direct consistency, and that strict rules are consistent. Any system which
satisfies monotonicity under strict rules will satisfy indirect consistency, and vice-versa.
Proof From [3, Prop. 7], direct consistency and closure yield indirect consistency. We assume direct consistency,
and monotonicity gives closure. 
In this section we have shown that the rationality postulates described in [3] can be described using axioms
from classical logic and non-monotonic reasoning. In future work, we intend to determine whether these axioms
can help identify additional rationality postulates. In addition, we will investigate whether these axioms can
represent the additional rationality postulates described in [17].
6 Related Work
There are several papers describing work that is similar in some respects to what we report here. Billington
[2] describes Defeasible Logic, a logic that, as its name implies, differs from classical logic in that it deals
with defeasible reasoning. In addition to introducing the logic, [2] shows that defeasible logic satisfies the
axioms of reflexivity, cut and cautious monotonicity suggested in [6], thus satisfying what [6] describes as
the basic requirements for a non-monotonic system (such a system is equivalent to a cumulative system in
[9]). [8] subsequently established significant links between reasoning in defeasible logic and argumentation-
based reasoning. To do this, [8] provides an argumentation system that makes use of defeasible logic as its
underlying logic, and shows that the system is compatible with Dung’s semantics [5]. Given Defeasible Logic’s
close relation to Prolog [15], this line of work is closely related to Defeasible Logic Programming (DeLP)
[7], a formalism combining results of Logic Programming and Defeasible Argumentation. As a rule-based
argumentation system, DeLP also has strict/defeasible rules and a set of facts. DeLP differs from ASPIC+ in
the types of attack relation it permits (no undermining) and in the way that it computes conclusions (it does not
implement Dung’s semantics).
7 Conclusions
In this paper we considered which of the axioms of [9] ASPIC+ meets based on two different interpretations
of the consequence relation. Somewhat surprisingly, we found that when strict and defeasible elements are
both present, ASPIC+ is not cumulative, and even in the presence of only strict rules, is not monotonic. These
results suggest that additional constraints need to be placed on any instantiation of ASPIC+. Since ASPIC+ is
intended as a template that can be instantiated with other logics (by the inclusion of strict rules that capture
the rules of inference of those logics), this is perhaps unsurprising. However, it does place constraints on what
those logics must bring if certain properties are required of that instantiation of ASPIC+. For example, rules
that capture contraposition are required for the strict part of ASPIC+ to be monotonic in the sense of [9]. We
also investigated the relationship between the axioms of [9] and the rationality postulates, and suggested an
alternative, axiom based formulation of the latter.
As mentioned above, we will investigate whether additional axioms can encode the rationality postulates
described in [17]. We will also examine the properties of different interpretations of the logical symbols. For
example, we assumed that ≡ encodes the presence of two rules, but says nothing about their preferences or
defeaters. Finally, we may consider other interpretations of the consequence relation. This paper therefore
opens up several significant avenues of future investigation.
9
References
[1] P. Baroni, M. Caminada, and M. Giacomin. An introduction to argumentation semantics. Knowledge
Engineering Review, 26(4):365–410, 2011.
[2] David Billington. Defeasible logic is stable. Journal of logic and computation, 3(4):379–400, 1993.
[3] Martin Caminada and Leila Amgoud. On the evaluation of argumentation formalisms. Artificial Intelli-
gence, 171(5):286–310, 2007.
[4] Martin Caminada, Sanjay Modgil, and Nir Oren. Preferences and unrestricted rebut. In Proceedings of
the 5th Intenational Conference on Computational Models of Argument, pages 209–220, 2014.
[5] P. M. Dung. On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic
programming and n-persons games. Artificial Intelligence, 77(2):321–358, 1995.
[6] D. M. Gabbay. Theoretical foundations for non-monotonic reasoning in expert systems. In K. R. Apt,
editor, Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Study Institute on Logics and Models of Concurrent Systems,
pages 439–457. Springer, 1985.
[7] Alejandro J Garcı´a and Guillermo R Simari. Defeasible logic programming: An argumentative approach.
Theory and practice of logic programming, 4(1+ 2):95–138, 2004.
[8] Guido Governatori, Michael J Maher, Grigoris Antoniou, and David Billington. Argumentation semantics
for defeasible logic. Journal of Logic and Computation, 14(5):675–702, 2004.
[9] Sarit Kraus, Daniel Lehmann, and Menachem Magidor. Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models
and cumulative logics. Artificial intelligence, 44(1):167–207, 1990.
[10] Zimi Li and Simon Parsons. On argumentation with purely defeasible rules. In Scalable Uncertainty
Management, pages 330–343. Springer, 2015.
[11] John McCarthy. Circumscription, a form of nonmonotonic reasoning. Artificial Intelligence, 13:27–39,
1980.
[12] S. Modgil and H. Prakken. A general account of argumentation with preferences. Artificial Intelligence,
195:361–397, 2012.
[13] Sanjay Modgil and Henry Prakken. The ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation: a tutorial.
Argument & Computation, 5(1):31–62, 2014.
[14] Robert C Moore. Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic. Artificial intelligence, 25(1):75–94,
1985.
[15] Donald Nute. Defeasible logic. In International Conference on Applications of Prolog, pages 151–169.
Springer, 2001.
[16] Raymond Reiter. A logic for default reasoning. Artificial intelligence, 13(1):81–132, 1980.
[17] Y. Wu. Between Argument and Conclusion - Argument-based Approaches to Discussion, Inference and
Uncertainty. PhD thesis, 2012.
10
